Drones and AI: the end of war-zone humanitarianism?

Introduction: AI-powered death from the sky

Since mid-2024 Russia has been deliberately killing Ukrainian civilians, humanitarian volunteers and medics with precision weapons. They use airborne drones to find and attack people, cars, city buses and ambulances. Many of those deaths have been confirmed by the The UN Human Right Council. As humanitarian volunteers, we have been working in danger areas – Kherson, Sumy, and Kharkiv region – while such atrocities were taking place. We claim that humanitarian volunteers helping people and animals have become priority targets for the Russians. Looking at how quickly the drone technology is changing the battlefield, it’s clear to us that war drones will forever change how we provide humanitarian aid to war victims. Maybe they will make it impossible altogether.

In this article, we are reviewing the impact of war drones: (1) how they affect humanitarian charities; (2) what are the types of war drones and how they work, and (3) how they affect war victims.

1. Impact of drone warfare on humanitarianism

Humanitarians working in frontline areas have always been risking their lives. We learned not to get closer than 7-10 miles to the front: that’s the range of mortar or field artillery. As long as we stayed outside of the danger zone, we were able to help people.

But by mid-2024, things have changed. Drones have impacted humanitarian work in several major ways.

2. We are targets

We are listing names of humanitarian volunteers injured and killed by Russia using war drones. First of all, we want to say that they aren’t forgotten. Their kindness, and selfless dedication to helping people and animals will always remain an example to all of us. They weren’t soldiers, they will receive no pension, no memorial plaque from the state. They went there because people desperately needed help, and nobody else was coming.

Their deaths is a dreadful lesson to all: this is not a theoretical debate any longer. The volunteers were not at the war front. They were killed while in civilian areas, helping people. Drones are affecting how we think about humanitarian work. Anyone helping the hungry, the sick or the disabled people in the war zone, can be targeted and killed.

Tigran Galustyan. On October 6, during an evacuation mission of the search and rescue unit “Rose in the Hand”, Tigran Galustyan died. He was 37 years old. This happened in the village of Ilyinka, Kurakhiv community. An enemy FPV drone attacked the volunteers’ car. According to police, Tigran died from his injuries, and his 32-year-old colleague received acubarotrauma.

Oleg Salnyk. 13.04.2025. In Kherson, in the evening, Russian invaders attacked a civilian car in the Dnipro district with an FPV drone. According to the head of the OVA, Oleksandr Prokudin, there were volunteers in it, one of whom was mortally wounded.

Rimma Baranenko. 01.12.2024 Animal volunteer Rimma Baranenko killed as a result of a Russian bomber-drone attacking a city bus in Kherson

14.08.2024. In the village of Bily Kolodyaz, Kharkiv region, Russians attacked a vehicle of the “Hospitaliery” medical battalion with an FPV drone, two volunteers were killed and three more people were injured.

Ruslan Horbal. 07.07.2025. A Russian FPV drone hit a car carrying volunteers who were evacuating animals from the Velyky Burlutsk community.

Chris Garrett. 08.05.2025. As Ukrinform reported, last week it became known about the death in Ukraine of 40-year-old British volunteer Chris Garrett, who was engaged in demining.

3. Types of war drones and how they work

3.1. Eyes in the sky

Both sides use both propeller and winged drones to gather surveillance information. 

Short-range quad-copters

Quad-copters (like Mavic 3) often carry a very high-precision camera, 4K or better. They are typically used to collect information in the immediate vicinity of the battle zone. They help to find the enemy or civilians, and direct the fire of missiles, mortar or artillery.

They have a limited range of 10-15 km and can stay in the air for 30-40 minutes.  They were extensively used for surveillance during the first chapter of the war. Now, in addition to the short-range Mavics, armies are actively replying on long-range drones.

Long-range surveillance drones

Winged drones, on the other hand, can patrol as far as 50 – 150 km. They have ultra-high resolution cameras, both for day and night vision. They can climb to high altitudes such as 5 km, which keeps them out of range for some air defences and cheaper propeller drones.

The video below shows multiple examples of Russia’s various winged drones, filmed close when taken down by Ukraine’s anti-drone air defences. You can see how many various models of winged drones have been deployed only by Russia.

Such winged drones are designed to survive strong radio interference (jamming) from anti-drone defences. If they lose radio link with the operator they will keep on course until they exit the jamming zone. At that time, the drone can pick up the signal and send the information it has collected.

Some models use internal combustion engines, and can remain in the air for a long time, such as 10 hours or longer. 

Orlan-10 is one of Russia’s main surveillance drones (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orlan-10). With a total weight of 16.5 kg, it can fly as high as 5km and remain airborne for 16 hours.

Orlan carries photo and video cameras. For the poor visibility conditions, it is equipped with a thermal imaging camera. A gyroscope mounting system for cameras improves image quality. The drone sends video and images over 3G and 4G mobile networks, from as far as 120 to 600 km. https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/orlan-10-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav/?cf-view 

Zala is another Russian drone developer and producer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZALA_Aero_Group). 

The Zala Z-16 model is widely used at the front. It has a maximum range of 75 km, and its operating altitude is from 200 metres to 5km. It can stay operational for 4 hours. It carries a 120 megapixel still camera, a full HD video camera, and a full HD thermal imaging camera. 

Zala’s onboard computer has artificial intelligence software, which helps it to identify vehicles and humans automatically.

Zala Z-16-5G is the company’s top model. It has a liftoff weight of 49.5kg, can scan an area of 100 km and remain in the air for 12 hours. Its maximum altitude is 3,600 m. 

Ukraine uses a range of locally-produced winged drones with compatible characteristics.

3.2. High-precision killer drones

Eyes in the sky are now effectively paired with kamikaze killer drones. After the surveillance drone has spotted a suspicious vehicle, the enemy can instantly send a killer drone to hit it. 

A typical killer drone carries an explosive charge. There are two main types of drones: bombers and FPV.

Bomber drones

Bomber drones are typically propeller drones, which will be used multiple times. Bomber drones carry one or several explosive charges: a hand grenade or a high-explosive fragmentation shell. The operator positions the drone over the target, and drops the charge. After that, the drone returns back.

The video below shows how bomber drones drops grenades on its targets on the ground.

Perhaps the most widely used model is commercial Mavic 3, which can carry an explosive charge as far as 7-10 km (15 km without load). It has a 4K camera and can both provide valuable intelligence information, and kill someone on the ground.

The soaring demand produced a great number of alternatives. For example, the drone PD-DADCAT-10X4 can carry an 3 kg explosive charge for up to 15 km, or 3.5 kg as far as 10 km (credit: polydrone.com.ua). This model’s advantage is its low price of only £400.

Kamikaze FPV drones: real-time precision killers with up to 25 miles of range

FPV stands for “first person vision”. They are driven by an operator who sees a live video stream from the camera mounted on the drone. The drone carries an explosive charge. The operator manoeuvres the drone, using a video-game controller, similar to what kids use for Playstation or X-Box. Ultimately, the operator crushes the drone into the target like a kamikaze airplane, exploding the charge.

Thanks to their visual control, FPV drones provide a horrifying method to damage a vehicle, injuring or killing everyone inside with an absolute precision. FPV drones offer higher precision than the bombers, because they are crushed literally into the target.

In the video below, Ukrainian drone team Muramasa of the 109th independent brigade demonstrate multiple examples of how their FPV drones hit enemy’s vehicles.

At the beginning of their development, kamikaze drones could only harm targets within a couple of miles (4-5 km). But due to the rapid development of electric motors and batteries, they can fly much farther. In tests open to the general public, quad-copter drones reach (25 miles) and more.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using radio re-transmitters. They allow FPV drones fly over long distances and beyond the radio horizon.

Loitering drones: over 40 miles range

Perhaps the most deadly type of FPV drone is Russia’s ZALA Lancet (or “Lancet”) loitering munition. It has two sets of cross-wings, one at the front and another at the rear. What makes Lancet stand out is its claimed range of over 40 miles (70 km). This is achieved by using aerodynamic wings.

Lancets are equipped with electric propeller-motors and travel at 80-110 km/h, accelerating up to 300 km/h on the downward trajectory just before hitting the ground target. There are two basic versions:

The light version Lancet 1 has a range of 25 miles (40 km). It carries a 1 kg explosive, and can stay in the air for 30 minutes.

The heavy version Lancet 3 lifts a 5 kg payload and can stay airborne for up to 40 minutes. It has an extended range of 25-43 miles (40-70 km). Source: armyrecognition.com

4. The harrowing cheapness of death

Kamikaze FPV drones are commercially available, and can be purchased without special authorisation (without the explosive charge). 

Despite their deadly capacity, FPV drones are very cheap. The cost of a kamikaze drone starts from £400. And yet they can destroy vehicles that cost thousands (and sometimes millions) of pounds. More expensive models will be equipped with high-performance batteries and night vision cameras. But in any event these drones are much cheaper than the vehicles they take out.

For example, this 10-inch FPV MARK 4 is offered by Ukrarmor absolutely openly, on the company’s website. It can lift up to 3kg of explosive charge. The drone is priced at £570. For £400 you can buy the 7-inch version of FPV MARK 4, which can carry a 2-kg payload. Both offer a range of 10 miles (17 km).

5. Artificial Intelligence

As we speak, both armies are officially starting to use Artificial Intelligence in their drone systems. This applies to both surveillance and kamikaze drones.

Russia’s Zala Z-16 claims to have an AI system installed onboard, which can process video in real time and identify targets. This information is then passed to the operator, who can decide what do next. We can assume that Russia actively developing and testing AI software as we speak, and all its mainstream drones will soon have it.

This summer, Ukraine’s Vyriy Drone claimed that it was about to start mass-production of FPV drones with AI. It has two functions: first, identifying a target, and keeping it locked. Secondly, guiding the drone to the target like an auto-pilot. This allows the drone to hit its target even when it lost communication with its human operator.

We can assume that all leading drone manufacturers are actively moving towards AI. At the time of writing, human operators are still in control. But it can well be that in just a matter of months AI algorithms will be deciding who will live or die today.

6. Should humanitarians continue in frontline areas?

Humanitarians who help people in frontline areas need to stop and think. The overview of the drone technology clearly shows that (a) humanitarian vehicles are monitored 24×7; (b) humanitarian workers can be mistaken for the military; (c) we can be hit us as far as 40 miles behind the front line.

The first reaction may be to withdraw from the high-risk areas affected by drone warfare. However, this is where the need for humanitarian assistance is often the greatest.

There may be a number of reasons why humanitarian work needs to be carried out in frontline areas. They include:

Civilians trapped due to the rapid change of the front line

The front line may move very quickly. This may turn previously safe villages and towns into highly dangerous zones. Civilians may need to be evacuated, or receive relief food, water and medications. 

For example, the town of Vovchansk was attacked by Russia’s army on 09th May 2024. This has turned all neighbouring villages into a danger zone. Those from Vovchansk with money relocated to safe areas in Kyiv, Lviv, etc. The poorest, however, fled to the villages nearby.

One of such villages is Novooleksandrivka. Our charity has been supporting this village and we have a first-hand experience and direct contact with the residents. As a result of the attack on Vovchansk, we started receiving requests for warm clothing for the refugees. Recently, in response, we delivered some of the required humanitarian aid.

Remote areas without essential supplies

Civilians in areas close to the front line do not get adequate access to food and essential medical services. They remain in close proximity to the front for many months. Examples of such areas include villages around Kupyansk, Lyman, Izium, Kherson.

Residents of these villages typically are very poor, without means to relocate to safer areas or cities like Kharkiv or Kryvyi Rih. In winter months, they struggle to access even basic food.

One such village is Osokorivka in the Kherson region. We visited and delivered humanitarian aid in early 2024.

These are just two examples. There are many more scenarios which require humanitarian intervention. 

7. Operational challenges for frontline humanitarian work

War drones have made our work even more dangerous than before. Here are top challenges we are facing every day:

Russia prioritises killing humanitarian volunteers

We have seen that Russian drone operators find and kill humanitarian volunteers. They are not in the trenches, not at the front. They are helping people well behind the front line.

Do not expose civilians

Humanitarians working in the war zone can now bring more danger for the civilians they are supposed to help. 

Firstly, they uncover the places of hiding, such as shelters and basements. Secondly, while humanitarian aid is distributed, large crowds of people can become an easy target. The Russian army has been terrorising and targeting civilians in Ukraine. If a surveillance drone spots a crowd of people queuing to receive humanitarian aid, it can direct a terrorist attack.

Poor training and inadequate behaviour

Humanitarian workers need to learn how to look out for kamikaze drones, how to behave in order not to attract one, and what to do if they have spotted one. 

If they do not know how to behave, they may panic, fail to protect themselves and put everyone at risk.

Humanitarians need to be trained on how to provide first aid for shrapnel and explosion wounds, and carry with them appropriate tactical first aid kits.

No adequate protection

While military vehicles are protected with radio jammers, armour, humanitarian cars have no protection. It’s too expensive for us. Armies have intelligence, they know where the danger is. We go blind. 

Development of humanitarian protocols for drone war

At Sunflower Scotland, we have modified our operational protocols to address the new types of risks introduced by drone warfare. 

IMPORTANT: we do not provide any advice to anyone on what to do, this is everybody’s own responsibility. 

Sunflower Scotland’s adjustments to the operating procedures include:

• Do not dress and behave like a military. Avoid camouflage or army green clothing. Use civilian-looking colours.
• Do not paint humanitarian vehicles in camouflage or army green.
• Wear a bulletproof vest under rather than over a jacket.
• Learn how to behave when an FVP drone is spotted in the aid
• Learn how to provide first aid for critical haemorrhage 
• When delivering aid, unload very quickly. 
• Do not assemble and keep crowds of people.
• Unload and get out as quickly as possible. 

Conclusions

As we stated in the beginning of this article, drone warfare has created new technical risks for humanitarian work in frontline areas. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons why civilians in these areas are in desperate need of humanitarian help, and why we cannot leave them behind: previously safe villages and towns become war zones. Other villages remain in limbo for months and years. 

As outlines above, we need to modify our operating procedures in order to continue helping people, given the risk of drone warfare.

It is an on-going process, rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. We understand that we should always think, assess new information and continue developing how we work. We want to continue helping people in the worst circumstances of their lives.